**Recent border friction along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh remains the dominant driver of trader views on the risk of a China-India military clash.** On October 18, Indian forces reported thwarting a Chinese People’s Liberation Army attempt to approach a forward position near Pangong Tso, with PLA troops firing warning shots after being dissuaded; China countered that Indian troops had crossed the LAC and required countermeasures. Days earlier, Beijing rejected India’s October 2 standardization of 28 place names in Ladakh—including sites in Aksai Chin—and reiterated claims over the western sector, prompting New Delhi to reaffirm Ladakh’s status as an integral territory. These exchanges occur against a backdrop of partial normalization: disengagement from 2020–2024 standoff points was completed in late 2024, Chinese deployments opposite India fell to roughly ten combined-arms brigades by 2025, and the August 2025 special-representative talks produced new military hotlines, commander-level meeting points, and an expert group for delimiting less contentious border sections. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar has stressed that sustained LAC stability is a prerequisite for broader trade, investment, and diplomatic progress. Upcoming factors include the next special-representative round scheduled for 2027 in India, continued Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination talks, and seasonal winter deployments that historically test patrolling rights. Persistent infrastructure activity on both sides and unresolved patrolling disputes keep low-level incidents possible, even as both capitals maintain diplomatic channels to prevent escalation.